optimjack-chain

OPTIMJACK — The Chain That Broke a CDN

A supply-chain attack on Optimizely’s tag CDN (November 2026) — one chain, seven links: injection → payload → iOS exploit kit → infrastructure → money → remediation → attribution.


A website that runs Optimizely loads JavaScript from cdn.optimizely.com and trusts it. That is the entire premise of a tag manager: the CDN is the quiet corner of the supply chain nobody audits — a few hundred bytes of third-party script, loaded on some of the busiest pages on the internet.

On 16 November 2026, that trust broke.

Attacker JavaScript was found appended inside Optimizely-served tag bundles — inside the very files a site requests as its trusted vendor code. ✅ Confirmed by direct retrieval of the poisoned bundles and by public analysis (amirulcyber.com, 16 Nov 2026 — the primary public write-up we worked from).

The injection was not a separate malicious file slipped into a page. It was a replacement of the trusted artifact itself: sites that did everything right — pinned CDN, subresource integrity on their own assets, modern TLS — still shipped the attacker’s code, because the trust anchor (the vendor CDN) was the compromised link.

The story of this attack is one chain with seven links. Breaking any one of them would have changed the outcome. We walked each link to its end.

The injected bundle code does something small and lethal: it appends a loader that fetches a single remote script.

Optimizely bundle (trusted) ──► appended loader ──► https://1688360.cc/track.js

✅ Confirmed. The loader bootstrap was captured in the live bundles; the remote script track.js was served by the C2 throughout the incident and was still being served (HTTP 200) at 22:54Z and 23:02Z on 16 November — hours after the purge of the bundles themselves.

The C2 host that served the loader is not a hardened criminal box. It is a same-day registration: 1688360.cc was registered 05:23Z on 16 November — the same hour the poisoning went live. ✅ Confirmed via registration/scan telemetry. It resolves to a Google Cloud IP (136.113.106.136, AS396982, *.bc.googleusercontent.com PTR) serving nginx with a TLS certificate issued at 05:04:54Z — minutes after domain registration, minutes before the attack went live. The root page is a catch-all Chinese-language decoy titled 闲言碎语 (“chit-chat”) — a placeholder that answers everything and explains nothing. ✅ Confirmed.

The workers inside the injected code patch the exploit kit’s default C2 (k68k.xyz) to the campaign domain eil786npto9u5bq.icu at runtime. ✅ Confirmed by decoding the served payloads. That one detail tells you the operators took an off-the-shelf kit and pointed it at their own infrastructure — they did not write the payload; they deployed it.

track.js is not one thing. It is a capability stack, and this is what makes the campaign serious:

  1. Crypto address clipper — the code watches clipboard and form content for wallet addresses and swaps them for attacker addresses (the wallet set in Link 5). ✅ Confirmed from live payload analysis.
  2. Card skimmer — form-grabbing for payment details, served alongside card.php and hit.php exfil endpoints on the C2 (both answered 204 No Content when probed). ✅ Confirmed from C2 endpoint inventory.
  3. Screenshot / cookie exfil — the C2 also serves html2canvas.min.js, a screenshot library — the exfil assembly line includes page capture. ✅ Confirmed from C2 file inventory.
  4. iOS second stage — an exploit kit. This is the headline. The “skimmer” narrative in early coverage was incomplete: the chain does not stop at stealing a credit card. ✅ Confirmed from live payload retrieval.

The iOS chain (DarkSword-style kit)

boot.js
  └─ A8 ─► B9 / C10 / D11 / D12          (obfuscated loader stages)
        └─ rce_loader.js / rce_loader_v5.js
              └─ rce_worker_18.{4,5,6,7}.js   (JSC + GPU RCE offsets)
                    └─ GhostWave harness
                          └─ post_exploit.js / native_bridge.js / nb_daemon.dylib
                                └─ PE into mediaplaybackd / SpringBoard
                                      └─ Coruna stage1 (cassowary / terrorbird /
                                         bluebird / jacurutu)  [iOS 15.2–17.2.1]

✅ Confirmed from live fetches of the staged payloads (files retrieved as data; none executed, no state-changing requests). The same file names and RCE-offset structure match public DarkSword reporting (Lookout, DarkReading). The trigger file evil_43818.heic was staged on 20 October — almost a month before the Optimizely CDN was hit. ✅ Confirmed from payload inventory.

Two infrastructure quirks confirm the operators were actively managing the kit in real time:

One negative result, recorded honestly: deep deobfuscation (base64/hex) of index.js, the A8 loader and all DarkSword files surfaced no additional hidden C2 hosts — the obfuscated strings are BigInt anti-debug math, and the only domain swap is k68k.xyz → eil786npto9u5bq.icu. ❌ Ruled out: “more hidden C2s hiding in the obfuscation.” The domain set stands as listed.

Pre-positioning was the tell. This was not an opportunistic hijack; the operator built the rails before the train ran:

Date (2026) Artifact Note
6 Oct netvigator.cc (Spaceship) cluster host, pre-positioned 41 days out
20 Oct evil_43818.heic DarkSword trigger file staged
28 Oct l7bcsnwc7nzr3uo.icu (Dynadot) telemetry host, 19 days before the CDN hit
9 Nov 5vobauua3ojpklx.icu (Global Asset Domains) iOS second-stage host
12 Nov first on-chain wallet activity before public disclosure
14 Nov moiubpagedocs.cc (Dynadot) cluster host
16 Nov 05:23Z 1688360.cc + eil786npto9u5bq.icu registered same day; poisoning went live same hour
16 Nov ~15:00Z public disclosure  
16 Nov 17:56Z payloads re-uploaded attacker kept working after being exposed
16 Nov 21:20Z attacker files still being edited  
16 Nov 21:29–21:38Z bundles purged remediation window closes

✅ All confirmed from registration records, scan corpora and live retrieval timestamps.

Victim surface. Third-party scan corpus (urlscan) for 1688360.cc grew past 230 scans at ~9/hour during peak analyst coverage, and contacted-domain scans confirmed poisoned bundles reaching: zoom.com, gitlab.com, smartsheet.com, scheels.com, klm.com, cnn.com, americangirl.com, hootsuite.com, intuit.com, managebuilding.com, loftliving.com, ow.ly, bbc.com — plus cluster hosts moiubpagedocs.cc / blogforge.vu. ✅ Confirmed via scan corpus. The BBC observation is the cleanest pin on the exposure window: an Intuit marketing link scan at 19:10Z showed the BBC page still contacting 1688360.cc (25–32 unique IPs, 138–180 requests) — the poisoned bundle was still being served to a top-10 global news site 4 hours after disclosure.

Cluster expansion (post-publication). The iOS-stage host eil786npto9u5bq.icu turned out to be one of two domains on the same freshly-provisioned Singapore GCP host (34.87.36.58, AS396982): a second random-string domain 1y69gy2mdzaltz1.icu resolves there too, its TLS certificate issued at 15:57:01Z — seven seconds after eil786...’s own cert (15:56:54Z). Same-name family, same issuer family (YE1/YE2), same provisioning batch. ✅ Confirmed via scan corpus + cert telemetry. The operator’s own tooling also predates the campaign: the JIUJIU888/weifile.html loader shell on the iOS host carries Last-Modified: 28 Jun 2026 — the kit’s admin/loader pages were built ~5 months before the Optimizely CDN was hit. ✅ Confirmed from HTTP headers. weifile.html is a 346-byte shell whose only content is <script src="index.js"> — it boots the obfuscated 50.7 KB index.js, and that execution beacons a second IP / second country (scan-level 2-IP count), consistent with the leaked telemetry domain l7bcsnwc7nzr3uo.icu. ✅ Confirmed at scan level; exact beacon target unconfirmed (login-gated scan detail).

The skimmer wallets are not static bait. They are live consolidation infrastructure, and on-chain forensics showed the gang working in real time.

ETH — collector 0xC4026b06D82b0F0B363eda0642D61CfbDc17884e:

TRX — collector THvs6p56XkUiMkJeSc51cAP64u2RsTYqxa:

BTC — accumulator 19g9rZcPeiz8rUvyWpTRyXXhPnjsWrc3kW:

TON — uninitialized, zero balance (the public article listed its raw address). ✅ Confirmed.

The engine behind the sweep (structure, corrected post-publication)

Deeper on-chain tracing changed the picture — and it matters for attribution. The TRX sink TD64NDwZ... is not a campaign-born wallet. It is a long-running Tron consolidation sink holding ~461,900 USDT (~$462k) at the last check, with a layered money flow behind it:

funders (TWnudLaFP1BM, TDnC6Qq6xus, TFRQz28W, TJUrkoyaEg, TXufTz8WDPgY)
   → intermediates (TH8kxgUv active since Aug, TLFxe3jyg since Nov 2)
      → sink TD64NDwZ (no outbound in the latest 50 transactions)

Evidence: ✅ Confirmed on-chain.

⚠️ Attribution caveat, kept honest: the ETH side is campaign-timed (collector first active Nov 12, 4,310.8 USDC sweep on Nov 16, 0.829 ETH → HitBTC at 19:40Z). The TRX sink’s ~$462k predates and overwhelms the campaign’s visible TRX volume. Either the same gang runs a long-term Tron clipper/cash operation (plausible — their own collector THvs6p56 predates the campaign by 8 months), or the OPTIMJACK loot feeds shared infrastructure. Unproven either way — labeled as-is.

The chain stayed live after disclosure

The engines kept running hours after the bundles were purged (checks 23:03Z, 16 Nov):

The pattern: sweep → DEX-swap or exchange deposit → fresh consolidation addresses. Watch list: 0x7005b45DE07e1b70DCD38eE3A708CFD88A6c7f8e, 0xfb6a6A1cDc9B01dea50aab8E85Da9Ab012E9B3Cf, TD64NDwZfQB6UASW2Xz6hWrz1T12p1pxL7 (sink), plus layers TH8kxgUv..., TLFxe3jyg..., funder TWnudLaFP1BM.... ✅ Confirmed.

Optimizely’s response, measured from the outside:

Sites affected must not stop at “bundle is clean.” The exposure window means any visitor between ~19:10Z and ~21:29Z on 16 Nov may have executed the loader. That is the remediation boundary for incident response teams: assume compromise of anything that ran the bundle in the window, rotate, inspect for the wallet-clipper side effects, and check iOS devices for the second stage.

What the evidence supports, and what it does not:

The IOC chain (for defenders)

Domains

1688360.cc            primary C2 / exfil (GCP AS396982, 136.113.106.136)   ✅
eil786npto9u5bq.icu   iOS second-stage host (JIUJIU888 marker)             ✅
5vobauua3ojpklx.icu   iOS second-stage host (boot.js, later pulled)        ✅
l7bcsnwc7nzr3uo.icu   telemetry C2 leaked from obfuscated index.js         ✅
moiubpagedocs.cc      cluster host                                         ✅
netvigator.cc         cluster host (since 6 Oct)                           ✅
blogforge.vu          cluster host                                         ⚠️
1y69gy2mdzaltz1.icu      NEW C2, same SG host 34.87.36.58 (cert batch)              ✅
k68k.xyz              kit default C2 (patched at runtime)                  ✅

Host / IP

136.113.106.136       C2 IP (GCP, ptr *.bc.googleusercontent.com)          ✅

Wallets (all live consolidation infrastructure as of checks)

0xC4026b06D82b0F0B363eda0642D61CfbDc17884e   ETH collector   ✅
0x7005b45DE07e1b70DCD38eE3A708CFD88A6c7f8e   ETH sweep (→ HitBTC) ✅
0xfb6a6A1cDc9B01dea50aab8E85Da9Ab012E9B3Cf   ETH recipient    ⚠️
THvs6p56XkUiMkJeSc51cAP64u2RsTYqxa           TRX collector (created Mar 2026) ✅
TD64NDwZfQB6UASW2Xz6hWrz1T12p1pxL7           TRX sweep        ✅
19g9rZcPeiz8rUvyWpTRyXXhPnjsWrc3kW           BTC accumulator  ✅
TWnudLaFP1BMKkkPCvVjjfnzrbzqvAgTG2       TRX funder (50k/3.5k Nov 16)   ⚠️
TH8kxgUvRFDQTUYPTHv6XUjSNTeTmxHWbv       TRX intermediate (Aug+)        ⚠️
TLFxe3jygjfLVJM6koqRUwCGYmBNGaVXHv       TRX intermediate (Nov 2+)      ⚠️
TDnC6Qq6xusErGsUVfjHnZxHvfYNHCjkTm       TRX funder (99k Aug)           ⚠️
TFRQz28WJ8tNjj3Spin1ZkcENwjhnGdouW       TRX funder (100k Aug)          ⚠️
TXufTz8WDPgYZn94VaxhFV3wyeezMu2LoH       TRX funder (77,950 Nov 2)      ⚠️
TMLQvDvpgxZ5zQGTadktRYWDpMjCz4DoYfv      older THvs6p56 sweep dest      ⚠️
0x80787af194C33b74a811f5e5c549316269d7Ee1A   HitBTC hot wallet (cash-out sink) ✅

File / path markers — track.js, card.php, hit.php, html2canvas.min.js (C2), boot.js, rce_loader.js, rce_loader_v5.js, rce_worker_18.{4,5,6,7}.js, post_exploit.js, native_bridge.js, nb_daemon.dylib, trigger evil_43818.heic. ✅

Live payload SHA256 hashes (captured 22:27–22:33Z, 16 Nov; none executed — byte-verified from retained evidence)

track.js (https://1688360.cc/track.js)                 acdf428f9cc564a9d16ff2a4f67e9af53dfa1bced92b4925283c8151581091fb
index.js (https://eil786npto9u5bq.icu/JIUJIU888/index.js) f33e040e5416be881f103186c226ad325381a287a6d0ee1f5e9fbfddcbc24507
rce_loader.js (…/B9/rce_loader.js)                     e027f69d350f83965519e5ad7d947807c17d763138eaa24d2042a2f5ac6f339e
rce_loader_v5.js (…/C10/rce_loader_v5.js)              d024dc37d8633382c3e2bed176132fd64322f4ce1c1bd11d563e700553c3b36c
D11/b.html (Coruna stage1)                              1bd3c4ed902616fefc29e92b8d8f0eaa0e8eaa96b4064f3d6c80b6e13977d3b6
boot.js (5vobauua3ojpklx.icu; same file as rce_loader_v5) d024dc37d8633382c3e2bed176132fd64322f4ce1c1bd11d563e700553c3b36c
rce_worker_18.6.js                                     54a54421cbdadc281a224713a97e3ccd9ba6dd3e2578e7e72864a47052ab4d00
A8 loader (a8_34ef)                                    d437b6799fc200f02832ee70a377b361471468bd887a133e26eb52832b7b2664

⚠️ Hashes are time-limited: the operator rotated track.js between the blog’s version and the live capture (different from f7b84b9a…), so hash matching works for the capture window, not forever. Domains, IPs and wallets are the durable signals.

Machine-readable IOC feed (pullable for TI pipelines): optimjack-ti.json in this repository —

Detection chain — what to look for

Postscript — the chain is still moving

At the last checks (23:38Z, 16 Nov): the C2 was still live — root decoy 闲言碎语 served HTTP 200 at 23:34Z, card.php answered 204 at 23:37Z, scan corpus at 233 — the TRX sink held 462,029 USDT and was still filling (no outbound), a second SG C2 domain (1y69gy2mdzaltz1.icu) had been identified, the BTC accumulator was still growing with no sweep, and the vendor had not yet published. This repository will be updated as the chain moves: a 24-hour scheduled re-check tracks C2 liveness, wallet sweeps, exchange deposits, and advisory status. The chain does not end because the bundles got cleaned — it ends when the money stops moving and the panel is found. It hasn’t ended.